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The growing importance of knowledge-based competition has prompted many firms to build
international cooperative ventures for skills acquisition and knowledge building.  Based on an
empirical study of a close collaboration in the knowledge intensive area between a British and
a Japanese high-technology firm, the paper examines how the socially embedded nature of
knowledge can impede cross-national collaborative work and knowledge sharing. The paper uses
Michael Polanyi's concept of 'tacit knowledge' in a much wider societal context. It develops a
conceptual model for analysing the main differences and 'points of friction' between the British
'professional' and the Japanese 'organisational' models of organisation of knowledge in high-level
technical work.  It shows how the dominant form of knowledge held in organisations, its degree
of tacitness, and the way in which it is structured, utilised and transmitted can vary considerably
between firms in different societal settings.  The study demonstrates a strong presence of 'societal
effects' on the knowledge base of the firm and how this might impose a limit on knowledge
sharing and organisational learning across national boundaries.
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7Preface
This paper by Alice Lam addresses one of the most important current debates in the economics
of knowledge and learning: What is the role of tacit versus codified knowledge? How do they
interact in the new context of the information and communication technological revolution? Does
the balance differ between social and national systems? One weakness with this debate has been
that it suffers from lack of specific data. Tacit knowledge cannot be directly measured by normal
quantitative indicators - if it could it would not be tacit. The only way to get a better idea about
its role in the economy is through painstaking case studies.
One of the pioneers moving in this direction has been Ikujiro Nonaka (Nonaka 1994 and
Nonaka&Takeuchi 1995). Based on a series of case studies in Japan, Nonaka has argued that
there is a specific Japanese model of learning that gives more emphasis to tacit knowledge (for
instance when developing new products) than the Western model. According to Nonaka, the
roots of these differences are to be found in the history of philosophy that in the Western case has
created a strong bias in favour of codified and formalised knowledge as opposed to experience
based and tacit knowledge.
In this context, I am happy to be able to present this paper by Alice Lam as a DRUID Working
Paper. It brings the debate on tacit knowledge further ahead and it is fascinating to read. The
paper follows up and tests the Nonaka hypothesis through a case study of technological
collaboration between a Japanese and an English firm operating in the field of information
technology. Basically, her study, based on interviews over a 4 year period, confirms the Nonaha
hypothesis. Her study does not only demonstrate that there are significant differences between
the B-firm and the J-firm, however. The specification of how the involved parties have
experienced the differences, in the form of direct quotes from the main actors, gives the reader
a good feeling of what is at stake. It tells you a lot about where the differencess come from, how
they materialise and what the consequences are?
There is a great need for further studies of this kind and also for some involving other national
and regional constellations (do the Asian tigers share the Japanese characteristics and is the
English case different from what you would find in for instance a firm rooted in France, Germany
and
Italy?). Such studies would be helpful both for the design of workable relationships in
international inter-firm co-operation and for analytical purposes. Differences in how knowledge
is produced, shared and used are at the very core of the concept of national systems of innovation.
While advocates of techno-globalism emphasise that the process of learning in relation to a
specific technology is becoming more similar across countries, it is important to find out to what
degree differences will remain because of international specificities in the societal setting.  
Bengt-Åke Lundvall
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9INTRODUCTION
The growing importance of knowledge-based competition has prompted many firms to build
international cooperative ventures for skills acquisition and knowledge building (Teece 1987;
Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1989; Kogut 1988; Baradaracco 1991; Westney 1987).  International
ventures are, however, extremely difficult to manage, prone to instability, and their failure rate
has been high (Perlmutter and Heenan 1986; Hergert and Morris 1988).  The potential difficulties
facing partner firms are even greater in collaborative ventures involving technology transfer and
knowledge sharing, such as joint R&D and product development.
Much of the existing literature has attributed the difficulties to problems of control, risk and
competitive tension endemic in such cooperative relationships and proposed the need to develop
appropriate governance structures for promoting stability, trust and boundary permeability
between partner organisations.  For example, Killing (1988) analyses the performance problems
of alliances arising from task structure and organisational complexity and suggests that alliances
undertaking tasks that require the combination of skills and resources provided by both partners
need more complex organisational arrangements.  Drawing upon prior work in transaction
economics and organisational theory, Osborn and Baughn (1990) argue that the quasi-hierarchical
form of governance structure is preferable for international joint R&D because it allows greater
control over complex judgemental tasks, and aids the transfer of non-codified technological
know-how.   In a similar vein, Powell (1987) emphasises the importance of developing stability
mechanisms and managing boundary permeability in reciprocal interdependent cooperative
ventures.  Although these studies have provided theoretical and practical insights into how the
choice of governance forms can influence the effectiveness of cooperative efforts, they have only
given a partial analysis of the nature of the problems firms face and have neglected many deeper
issues related to knowledge sharing and technology transfer within a global context.
This paper argues that, for firms engaged in collaborative ventures involving intensive knowledge
sharing and technology transfer, many of the difficulties encountered cannot easily be resolved
through the appropriate design of governance structures.  This is because many of the problems
lie not in structural barriers but in the nature of knowledge itself and its social embeddedness.
Following Polanyi (1962; 1966), Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that a large part of human
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knowledge is context bound, highly firm-specific and tacit in nature; and that there are limits to
which it can be effectively articulated and transferred. Badaracco (1991) uses the term 'embedded
knowledge' to denote the fact that some of the knowledge being created around the world is not
migratory because it is highly embedded in complex social interactions and team relationships
within organisations.  Unlike migratory knowledge which can be easily encapsulated in 
formulas, manuals and blueprints, embedded knowledge is extremely 'sticky' and it moves only
very slowly.  Rebentisch  and Ferretti (1995) depict organisations as bundles of embodied
knowledge which include technology, procedures, organizational structures and hierarchical
relationships.  Their analysis suggests that an organisation's knowledge architecture has a
systematic structure of its own and hence differences in the knowledge architectures between
organisations can inhibit knowledge transfer.  Taking all these arguments a step further, one
would expect the problems of knowledge sharing and transfer within a global context to be
amplified  because of the greater diversity of knowledge and organisational systems and their
socially embedded nature.  Given the different ways in which knowledge and skills are formed,
organised and utilised in different societal settings, its degree of 'tacitness' and ease of transfer
can differ. Incompatibility in the knowledge structures and work systems between partner firms
can generate many difficulties and conflicts in joint work.  The different degree of tacitness of
knowledge can also cause asymmetry in knowledge transfer.
Based on an empirical analysis of high-technology collaborative ventures between a British and
a Japanese firm, this study illustrates how the socially embedded nature of knowledge can impede
joint work and the effective transfer of knowledge across national boundaries.   The study focuses
especially on joint technology development involving intensive knowledge sharing and exchange
between the engineers of the partner firms.  It examines how the diversity in the organisation of
knowledge and technical work has caused difficulties in collaborative work and inhibited the
formation of integrated work teams.  It also illustrates how the different degrees of tacitness of
knowledge between the partner firms have caused difficulties in knowledge sharing and led to
an asymmetry in its transfer.  
The next section provides a conceptual framework outlining the key concepts and perspective
adopted in the study.
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THE SOCIALLY EMBEDDED NATURE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
FIRM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The concept of embeddedness, as used by Granovetter (1985), refers to how behaviour and
institutions are affected by networks of social relations.  In this paper, the concept is used to
analyse the nature of the knowledge of the firm from two perspectives: the organisational and
societal.  At the organisational level, the concept of embeddedness concerns the extent to which
the knowledge of the firm is embedded in organisational routines, work practices and networks
of human relations (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander 1992; 1996).  In other words,
it refers to the degree of 'tacitness' and collectiveness' of the knowledge of the firm.
At the societal level, the notion of embeddedness refers to how societal institutions influence and
shape the structure of knowledge within the firm (Granovetter 1992; Tsoukas 1996). There is a
large body of research in comparative management which has established persistent significant
national differences in the way work is organised and structured.  This argument has been
conceptualised as the 'societal  effect' (Maurice et al 1980), the 'neo-contingency framework'
(Sorge 1991), or 'national business systems' (Whitley 1990).  The main argument is that social
institutions influence firms' strategies and work practices in a systematic way, with the result that
firms' structures and processes reflect distinctive national patterns.  Following the basic tenet of
this earlier research, this section develops a conceptual model for analyzing  different societal
approaches to the  organisation of knowledge.
The model presented here attempts to explain how the nature of knowledge,  its distribution and
ownership, and patterns of utilisation within the firm are closely interconnected with the way
work is organised and coordinated, which in turn is shaped by  different societal models of skills
formation, labour markets and occupational structures.  It further suggests that the codifiability
of knowledge, that is, the extent to which knowledge can be structured into a set of identifiable
rules and procedures for communication,  and its ease or difficulty of transfer can vary greatly
between organisations in different societal settings.  This approach echoes Boisot's (1995a) more
general analysis of the relationship between the codifiability of knowledge, societal culture and
institutions.  Boisot argues that different societies, for various historical and cultural reasons,
have displayed preferences for different levels of codification and forms of knowledge exchange.
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 Western culture, according to Boisot, has extended spatially across the globe and it has
developed a marked preference for codification and abstraction of knowledge. In contrast,
Japanese society has displayed a marked preference for restricted codes and hence the build up
of a shared context is critical for communication and information exchange. The basic argument
put forward by Boisot is that, the codification and diffusibility of knowledge is systematically
related.
Boisot's study highlights the general patterns of relationships between  societal culture and
institutions, codification of knowledge and its diffusion.  The framework developed in this paper
attempts to explain in much more concrete terms how the configurations of the knowledge of the
firm, its degree of tacitness and codifiability is shaped by different societal models of knowledge
formation, labour markets and occupational systems. 
The nature and organisation of the knowledge of the firm can vary along three major dimensions.
First is the dominant form of knowledge in use and its degree of 'tacitness'.  The notion of 'tacit
knowledge' was first expounded by Michael Polanyi (1962).  Based on  the simple observation,
'We know more than we can tell', Polanyi argued that a large part of human knowledge is
occupied by knowledge that cannot be articulated - 'tacit knowledge'.  This is particularly true in
the case of operational skills or know-how acquired through practical experience and observation
rather than formal learning.  It is indeed a common situation in our daily lives that a person is
able to do something and yet unable to explain how it is done.  To put it in Polanyi's (1962: 49)
words, 'the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are
not known as such to the person following them'.  'Not known as such' here means that the person
is unable to give a useful explanation of the rules, and hence the knowledge underlying the skill
is 'tacit'. The type of knowledge in use in different organisations can range from highly tacit to
fully articulable knowledge (Winter 1987).  As noted by Nelson and Winter (1982: 78), 'tacitness'
of a skill, or rather of the knowledge underlying the skill, is a matter of degree.  So an important
question is what makes 'tacit knowledge' a more important part of the knowledge system in some
organisations than others.  It seems that the approach or method of skills formation and
knowledge acquisition plays an important part in determining the dominant form of knowledge
held in organisations and its degree of tacitness.  For analytical purposes, it is possible to make
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a distinction between two contrasting societal models of (high level) skills formation, namely the
Japanese 'organisational' model versus the British 'professional' model.
The organisational model is closely connected with the existence of an internal labour market
where skills are mainly formed through firm-specific on-the-job training (OJT) on a long-term
basis.  Within this approach, the learning principles are similar to those of apprenticeship where
individuals accumulate skills and knowledge through practical hands-on experience or learning
by doing.   Knowledge accumulated through this process, referred to as 'knowledge of experience'
by Nonaka (1994), tends to be highly 'tacit' and context bound.  It is tacit at the individual level
because the emphasis on 'action' or 'doing' rather than formal theoretical learning means the
individual may only have limited causal understanding of the knowledge underlying the action
and hence is not able fully to articulate it.  'Knowledge of experience' is also context bound
because such knowledge is accumulated and developed according to the specific requirements
of the firm.  It is organised around a set of rules and a myriad of relationships which enable the
organisation to function in a coordinated way. Barley (1996) refers to this as 'the distributive
nature of contextual knowledge' within a community of practice.  In other words, the knowledge-
in-use is embedded in specific organisational routines and operating procedures understood and
shared by members with common experience and values.  Hence much of the knowledge held
within the organisation is also 'tacit'.
In contrast to the organisational model,  the professional model of knowledge formation is
commonly associated with the existence of an external labour market where the acquisition of
general and standardised knowledge applicable to different contexts is important.  The main
method of skills formation is through formal education and training in learning institutions
leading to a certified qualification.  Knowledge acquired through formal training, referred to as
'knowledge of rationality' by Nonaka (1994), tends to be more abstract and theoretical.  It is also
more standardised and tends to develop in line with the 'best practice' of the profession rather
than the specific requirements of the firm.  Unlike 'knowledge of experience' which is quite
specific to particular contexts and is rarely formulated in a logical consistent way, formal
theoretical knowledge is generic, highly rationalized, and internally coherent (Whitley 1995: 85).
 It is also context free in the sense that it can be used in different situations and purports to apply
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to a wide array of phenomena.  Unlike tacit knowledge which cannot easily be severed from its
prevailing context, this type of formal knowledge is more explicit and discrete and thus
characterised by its relative ease of transfer.
    
A second dimension along which the organisation of knowledge can differ concerns its structure,
that is, how knowledge and skills are distributed and utilised within the firm.  This is closely
related to the way work is organised and coordinated, and the career and job classification
systems prevailing in different societies.  The structure of the knowledge of the firm can vary
from one that is highly diffused and group-based to one that is task specific and individual-based.
 The contrasts between the organisational and professional models are striking here.  The
organisational model is characterised by the absence of an external occupational labour market
and rigid job classification systems.  This allows flexible utilisation and deployment of human
resources  within the firm.  Within this approach, job boundaries tend to be broad and
ambiguous.  Individuals undertake a wide range of jobs and duties through job rotation.  A good
example is the rotation of R & D engineers to work on the production floor to broaden skill
development and encourage knowledge transfer.  Job rotation gives individuals the opportunity
to develop a broad range of skills and knowledge outside their own specific functions and
expertise, and encourages the development of contextual and integrative problem solving skills
(Aoki 1988).  It also facilitates group learning and collective sharing of knowledge and helps to
reduce the social distance between different categories of the workforce.  As a result, the
knowledge structure becomes very diffuse and there is a considerable overlap and transmission
of knowledge across individuals and jobs.   The professional model of work organisation is,
however, quite different.  Job allocation within the firm is closely related to the formal
demarcation of skills and occupational boundaries commonly applied in the external labour
market.  The key principle for organising work is to make best use of any  particular talents or
expertise in specific areas.  Within this approach, job boundaries are clearly delineated and each
individual follows a narrow and specialised job path throughout their career.  This approach
encourages the development of deep and specialised knowledge at the individual level. But the
scope of knowledge and experience tends to be rather limited and specific to the task performed.
 As a result, there is much less overlap  of knowledge across individuals or job boundaries,
making it more difficult to achieve cross-functional integration.  For example,  engineers
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specialising in upstream conceptual design may not be able to appreciate the relevance of
downstream operational knowledge to their specific tasks. The professional model generates a
knowledge structure that is highly individual-based and task-specific.   
This takes us to a third,  related dimension of variation: the method of coordination and
knowledge transmission.  One primary task of the firm, as noted by Grant (1996), is to develop
effective mechanisms for coordination and knowledge integration.  The mechanisms for
coordination, however,  can vary from one that is highly tacit and human-network-based to one
that is explicit and document-based.  The main method used is determined by the extent of
'common knowledge' present in the organisation, the level of trust and  implicit shared codes
which the system is able to generate and the degree of external mobility of individual knowledge
and expertise.   The Japanese organisational model is characterised by a strong preference for
human-network-based coordination and knowledge transmission.  The diffuse job structure
permits the mutual intrusion of job territories between individuals and functional groups, leading
to the accumulation of a stock of common knowledge and shared implicit 'coding schemes'.
Nonaka and Takeuchi use (1995) the term 'redundancy' to describe the way in which the Japanese
form of work organisation enables individuals to accumulate 'extra' knowledge not specifically
related to their specific tasks and thus helps to generate trust and team cooperation.  The practice
of long-term employment and intensive on-the-job training further facilitates the formation of
a stable shared context.  Within such a system, knowledge is utilised and transmitted through
intensive and extensive interaction between group members.  Coordination is achieved through
mutual adjustment and is not dependent upon the need for communication in explicit codes.
Knowledge is generated and stored 'organically' in team relationships and organisational routines.
 This type of knowledge is not amenable to systematic codification and can only be accessed and
transferred through intimate social interactions (Kogut and Zander 1992: 389).    In contrast, the
professional model encourages individual specialisation and ownership of knowledge. 
Knowledge is stored independently in the individual 'experts' within specific functional groups.
 The pattern of division of labour and clear demarcation of job boundaries reduces the
opportunities  for the different individuals and functional groups to accumulate common
knowledge and develop shared codes.  Within such a system,  effective coordination cannot be
achieved without the systematic codification of personal knowledge into an explicit form. 
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Hence, the importance of written rules, procedures and detailed specifications.  Moreover, within
the professional model, the concentration of knowledge in individual experts puts the firm in a
highly vulnerable situation when individuals leave. It becomes necessary for the firm to develop
systems for abstracting knowledge from the individuals and storing it in written procedures and
documents so as to retain it and make it accessible to a wider circle of individuals (Bonora and
Revang 1993).  This form of knowledge storage can be described as 'mechanistic' and the
dominant mode of coordination and knowledge transmission is document-based.  Knowledge
stored in codified form is more transparent and readily accessible.  It is inherently more diffusible
than uncodified knowledge (Boisot 1995b). 
The above has provided a conceptual framework illustrating how the structure of knowledge and
its degree of tacitness can differ between organisations in different societal settings.  The rest of
the paper provides empirical evidence to illustrate the contrasts between the Japanese
organisational and the British professional models of organisation of knowledge in high-level
technical work.  It gives an analysis of the operational problems and difficulties generated by the
incompatibility between the two systems. It also examines the effects of these differences on
collaborative work and discusses the extent to which the differing degree of tacitness of
knowledge might lead to asymmetry in knowledge transfer and inhibits organisational learning
across national boundaries.
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, a brief outline of the background of the study and
the research method used.
THE CASE STUDY : A JAPANESE-BRITISH HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
COOPERATIVE VENTURE
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is based on an in-depth case study of a Japanese
and a British high-technology collaboration in a knowledge-intensive industry.  The partner firms
are both global competitors in the electronics industries.  The Japanese firm  (hereafter referred
to as J-firm) acquired a majority stake in the British firm (hereafter referred to as B-firm) several
years ago. The relationship between the two companies, however, is not one of a successful
organisation taking over the  'unsuccessful'.  It is more of a horizontal collaborative relationship
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and there is a high degree of mutual respect between them.  The collaboration is driven by a
strong technological as well as strategic logic: there is an expectation that it would enable the two
firms to take advantage of the complementarity of each other's knowledge and expertise to
achieve synergistic benefits and raise their competitiveness in the global market.  It is
characterised by a strong desire for knowledge sharing and knowledge creation: a strategic
partnering described as 'knowledge links' by Badaracco (1991). The success of the collaboration
is highly dependent on the ability of the two firms to forge a close working relationship to enable
the mutual sharing and transfer of technological knowledge and expertise.  It hinges on the
effective management of joint product development activities which require the close
collaboration and interaction of a large number of engineers and technical specialists from the
two firms.  In other words, effective collaboration requires the two organisations to engage in an
intensive process of organisational learning.
Close collaboration of this kind provides an ideal situation for observing the contrasts and
potential 'points of friction' between the two different organisational systems  based in two
different societal contexts.  Although the two firms operate in the same industry and are subject
to similar technological and task contingencies,  they are located in two very dissimilar societies
and hence the influence of societal effects can be expected (Maurice et al 1980; Sorge 1991;
Mueller 1994).  Collaboration introduces 'disturbances' to the two socially embedded systems and
thus brings to the forefront key aspects of divergence between the two systems.
The approach adopted in this study constitutes a new form of comparative organisational
research.  Unlike most of the existing comparative studies which tend to look at matched samples
of organisations located independently in different countries, this study examines the interaction
of nationally-based organisations across national boundaries.  It allows the observation of the
processes and, potentially the outcomes, of the interaction between two socially distinctive
organisational systems.  Interaction reveals differences between the two systems as perceived and
experienced directly by the actors themselves, rather than imputed from the researcher's
observation of organisational structures.  This is particularly important for the purpose of this
study which is to analyse the differences between the knowledge base of the two firms and their
effect on joint work.  Given the tacit nature of knowledge and its social embeddedness, the
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contrasts between the two systems cannot be  easily deduced from the organisational structures.
 The interaction and points of friction as experienced by the actors in the collaborative process
provides a more appropriate 'window' through which one may examine the differences.  The
problems experienced by the actors in their joint work also highlights the nature and scale of the
problems generated, illustrating the practical outcomes of societal effects on global collaboration.
   
The data were collected primarily by in-depth individual interviews with about 50 staff, both in
Japan and Britain.  The majority of them were engineers and project managers directly engaged
in joint technology development projects and exchange programmes between the two firms. 
Interviews have also been  conducted with top management in both firms.  About 20 interviews
were first carried out in 1992 and further interviews with another 30 staff were carried out
between 1994 and 1995.  Some of the key staff were interviewed twice over the period.  This has
enabled the researcher to track the development of the collaborative relationship over time.  The
interviews were conducted in Japanese and English. Each interview lasted for about 90 minutes
to 2 hours and all were transcribed.   The interview sample is shown in Table one. 
Table 1  The interview sample
Categories J-firm B-firm
 Engineers and managers
 directly engaged in
 collaborative work  13 13
 Staff on
 exchange programmes 10 5
 (mostly engineers)
 Coordinating managers
 from Japanese parent based
 in B-firm  (all) 3 -
 Top management and senior 3 3
 personnel staff
 Total 29 21 
19
TWO CONTRASTING KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS IN HIGH-LEVEL
TECHNICAL WORK: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The interviews identify major differences between the knowledge and work systems of the two
partner firms along the three dimensions discussed above.  These differences are most vividly
reflected in the 'points of friction' in their joint work. It should be noted that many of the
divergent characteristics are not unique to the case study firms but reflect general differences in
the organisation of knowledge and technical work commonly found between electronics firms
in the two countries (Lam 1994; 1996)
 
1.  Differences in the knowledge base of engineers : 'Knowledge of Rationality' vs.
'Knowledge of Experience'
It is commonly assumed that the knowledge base and competence criteria of engineers are
universal.  However, evidence from the study shows that the dominant form of knowledge on
which engineers' skills and expertise are based, and its degree of tacitness vary significantly
between B-firm and J-firm. 
Although both partner firms in the study employ predominantly graduate engineers in design and
development work, their approaches to work differ greatly.  Overall, the engineers in B-firm base
their specialist expertise primarily on abstract theoretical knowledge acquired through formal
training.  In contrast, their Japanese counterparts rely heavily on practical know-how and
problem-solving techniques accumulated in their workplace. These differences are clearly
manifested in the way they carry out product development. While B-firm engineers adopt a
logical and consistent approach based on clearly defined procedures and rational planning, J-firm
engineers tend to emphasise action and experimentation using their judgemental skills and
operational know-how.  Such differences often lead to mutual criticisms and frustrations among
the interfacing engineers.  For example,  many B-firm engineers simply could not see the logic
of the Japanese approach;   many described the lack of rigorous planning among the J-firm
engineers as a 'scatter brain effect':
You've got two ways of doing something.  You are either very much more rigorous about
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the way you design it and try to ensure you do it right, or you just have a scatter brain
effect and just hope something will work.  This is the way I see J-firm...A lot of people
do lots of little things and its like waiting for revolution.
A number of B-firm engineers seconded to work in J-firm made the remark that 'there was a lot
of make do work' in J-firm.  Others commented that J-firm young engineers were 'almost like
apprentices' because they did not seem to engage in  much logic design.
J-firm engineers, in contrast, were frustrated by the lack of  practical know-how and concrete
detailed knowledge among their British partners:
They can read the specifications but I am not sure they have the ability to make the
product.  I think we have far more technical capacity - we've got the know-how.  On this
project, we have to supply them with a lot of our know-how but it's really difficult. 
There's so much of it which simply cannot be captured only by reading the documents...
Another project manager in J-firm, engaged in a major collaborative project, made the following
observation:
These people are supposed to be engineers but the way they approach their design is
somewhat... I mean its quite different from the way we do things here.  They are not
concerned about the details.  The design itself is quite logical but the actual movements
of the circuits - there's still so much verification work to be done, for example, the noise
generated by this machine - you need to have the know-how acquired through practical
experience to deal with it.  I don't think they have the experience ... At the end of the day,
we are the ones who've got the know-how to come up with a design that can be turned
into a real product.  Theirs is no more than a piece of abstract theoretical design... 
The contrast between the knowledge base of these two groups of engineers is partly a result of
the different engineering qualification system in the two countries, and partly a reflection of the
different skills formation and utilisation practices in the workplace.  In Britain, the route to
engineering skills formation shifted dramatically during the 1960s from the traditional part-time
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and evening work-based study towards an emphasis on formal university education (Finniston
1980).  This trend has been reinforced by the attempt of the professional institutions to raise the
occupational status of engineers by restricting full professional membership status to graduate
engineers.  The exclusiveness of membership has meant that the acquisition of formal academic
knowledge through university education has come to occupy a central place in the engineering
qualification system in Britain.  This has led to a general perception, among the graduate
engineers, of the superiority of theoretical knowledge to practical experience, and is closely
associated with the delineation of job boundaries between engineers and technicians in the
workplace.  Further, in most British universities, the engineering degree courses emphasise early
specialisation and are mainly devoted to engineering science.  Students typically reach the
graduation stage with a knowledge of engineering science and of analytical tools but they usually
have little experience and practical engineering skills (Finniston 1980).  Firms often recruit these
graduates straight into highly specialised work roles, utilising their general theoretical knowledge
and analytical ability in upstream conceptual design functions.  And because of the high job
mobility rate among the graduate engineers, most employers neither have the incentive to provide
them with practical on-the-job training nor the opportunities for expanding their scope of
experience (Causer and Jones 1993; Lam 1994).  As a result, the knowledge base of the majority
of British engineers tends to be highly theoretical and specialised, and their work role is limited
primarily to upstream conceptual design and development activities.
In Japan, the approach to engineering skills formation is quite different.  It has historically placed
a high value on the importance of developing the practical skills of engineers in the workplace.
 This is due, in part, to the fact that industrial development in Japan was historically based on
imported technology, and Japanese engineers have played an important role in translating
imported theoretical knowledge into concrete operational details  for shop-floor workers
(Morikawa 1991). Thus Japanese firms have always placed a strong emphasis on developing the
on-site practical knowledge of their graduate engineers in order to facilitate technology transfer.
 This, coupled with the long-term nature of the employment relationship, means that skills
formation in the workplace rather than university education is the most important source of
engineering skills in Japan.  The university degree in Japan is far more general and broad-based
than that in Britain. It seeks to develop the basic analytical and conceptual aspects of engineering
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upon which firms build technology specific knowledge and skills (Chung 1986).  Unlike in
Britain where employers seek 'to buy' readily available specialised expertise from the external
market, Japanese employers prefer 'to make' their own technical staff through  intensive and
extensive on-the-job training (Lam 1993).   Young graduate engineers are not expected to be
immediately useful.  They normally spend their initial years in a wide range of peripheral
technical tasks and gradually accumulate their knowledge and expertise through allocation to a
wider range of more complex tasks.   The key method of skills formation is through learning by
doing and working together with the more experienced staff.  The type of knowledge transmitted
through this method tends to be judgemental, diffuse and not formulated in a strictly logical
consistent way. It is more informal and tacit. It concerns primarily recipes for action or concrete
problem-solving techniques rather than logical thinking or internal theoretical consistency. 
Hence the 'scatter brain effect' perceived by the British engineers. 
2.  Contrasting knowledge structures and organisation of product development:
Task-Specific Sequential Structure vs. Diffuse-Overlapping Structure . 
The contrasting methods of skills formation and utilisation practices are also underpinned by the
patterns of division of labour and the distribution and integration of knowledge in the work
systems of the partner firms.  These differences are most vividly reflected in the way the two
firms organise product development and manage the flow and integration of knowledge across
the different phases of the product cycle. 
In B-firm, product development is organised on a sequential and hierarchical basis.  It is
characterised by a high degree of role specialisation and functional differentiation with separate
groups responsible for different stages of the product cycle.  Staff responsible for upstream
product planning and concept creation are separated from  those carrying out development. 
These people are in turn clearly delineated from those engaged in downstream process
engineering and production.  Projects go through several stages in a logical step-by-step manner,
moving sequentially from one stage to the next after all the requirements of the previous stage
have been completed.  The knowledge and expertise required for each stage is discrete and self-
contained.  Product development is led, and driven, by a small group of 'talented' technical
experts.  These people are primarily responsible for the generation of new product concepts
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which will then be taken forward and broken down into concrete details for development and
production by separate functional groups further down the line.  Within this approach, the flow
of knowledge tends to be unilateral and hierarchical.   There is a concentration of knowledge and
information in a small group of experts at the top of the work hierarchy.  
The approach adopted by J-firm differs significantly.  It can be described as 'integrated' or
'overlapping'.  It is characterised by tight horizontal linkages, flexible division of labour and by
a reciprocal flow of knowledge and information across functional boundaries and different phases
of the product cycle.  In J-firm, responsibility for product planning lies in the hands of the
product development groups rather than specialist product planners, and the boundary line
between planning and development is blurred.   In particular, J-firm puts a strong emphasis on
forging a close link between the upstream concept design and downstream  process engineering
and manufacturing.  Product development in J-firm is typically undertaken by a multi-functional
project team comprising members of diverse backgrounds, including planning, design and
development, testing, quality assurance and production. The essence of this approach is to draw
on the knowledge and experience accumulated in all phases of the cycle.  The flow of knowledge
is bilateral and continues throughout the whole development process.  Product development in
J-firm is characterised by a diffuse and decentralized knowledge structure.  It is driven by
knowledge generated continuously through cooperation and interaction among the diverse team
members.
The above contrasts are clearly visible in the work roles and responsibilities expected of
individual engineers.  B-firm's sequential approach operates on the basis of clear delineation of
task responsibilities and individual contribution.  It encourages the accumulation and ownership
of deep and specialised knowledge at the individual level.  In contrast, the overlapping approach
in J-firm requires shared division  of labour, mutual intrusion of job territories and collective
learning.  Several B-firm engineers seconded to work in J-firm complained about 'not being left
alone to do [their] own thing'. Some were frequently frustrated by 'not knowing whereabouts in
the process [their] responsibility ends...'. Others felt extremely uncomfortable about the 'intrusion
of Japanese colleagues into their job territories:
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In our company, if you have a plan, if it is worth doing, you write it down, you have a
meeting, you decide on it and then you do it and then you'd have periodic reviews and if
it turns out to be a waste of time it gets scrapped.  It was always proprietary, your own
work, no-one else's, you're not competing.  Where we are now [in J-firm] it's all...
someone else has got to see my product.  It's like 'oh let's see, I thought that's quicker than
this one...
In contrast, J-firm engineers working in B-firm often found it difficult to operate effectively
because of 'not knowing how my tasks fit into the whole'.
The differences between the two approaches are also reflected in the size and composition of the
project teams dispatched by the partner firms to work on joint projects.  While the teams from
B-firm tend to be much smaller, comprising a few specialist product planners and engineers who,
to put in their own words, 'are primarily responsible for developing the front end of product
specifications and requirements'; J-firm often sends a large team of diverse members including
staff in development, design, manufacture, and validation.  The team from B-firm are often
overwhelmed by the size and diverse backgrounds of the members from J-firm  with whom they
have to deal.  The following remarks by the project managers and engineers from B-firm are
revealing:
They have much larger teams than we do for doing an equivalent kind of work.  For
instance, we might have a group of five people and they would have a group of 15 people
doing almost the same work...
...for the project that X was managing there was I think may be 12 people, average,
working on this project in England over the three years.  And then for a similar type of
project in Japan, J-firm had many more people.  Just the project that was about a quarter
the size of our project was this team of 20...
...the Japanese tend to get everybody involved.  For example, obviously this project
involved a lot of their different groups, like their DA group and the liability groups, and
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technology groups, and circuit groups etc - lots of different bits.  And before they commit
to anything, all the groups have to be involved. Whereas we tend to make the decision,
then go back and sort it out later with all the different groups...  Its' very frustrating and
we don't know how to cope with the long discussion that goes on...
The different project team composition also reflects the level of influence exercised by the
different functional groups and the type of knowledge that is valued and perceived as relevant.
In B-firm, a sharp distinction is drawn between upstream concept design ('thinking') and
downstream production ('doing').   The engineers who specialise in upstream  'thinking' activities,
who take the lead in product development, tend not to perceive downstream 'doing' knowledge
as directly relevant to their work. In contrast, in J-firm the boundary between 'thinking' and
'doing' is blurred.  It emphasises the tight integration of upstream and downstream engineering
activities and the early involvement of downstream staff in product development.  It is a common
practice for J-firm to include quality and manufacturing staff in their product development teams.
 Indeed, the manufacturing function in J-firm has a high profile and strong influence in product
development.  However, on a number of joint project planning meetings, the team from B-firm
who saw their main roles in upstream concept design, felt reluctant to deal with the quality and
manufacturing staff from J-firm.  This has generated a great deal of ill-feeling among J-firm's
team members.  A J-firm project manager commented on the problem:  
... they see manufacturing as a completely separate process, this is their way of thinking.
 But for us and indeed most Japanese companies, manufacturing and development are
closely tied up with each other and we cannot draw a clear line between the two.  In
actual fact, our organisational structure is set up like this.  They were unhappy to see our
engineering staff from manufacturing attending the meeting...  The way they treated our
members from manufacturing was problematic.
The different degree of integration of downstream operational knowledge in product development
has also meant that different priorities and criteria are taken into account by the partner teams.
 Whereas the team in B-firm are often concerned about general business criteria such as cost and
markets, the team in J-firm tend to take into account specific technical criteria such as  product
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functionality, quality and manufacturing feasibility.  These differences have frequently led to
mismatched expectations and conflicts in many of the joint projects.
3.  Methods of coordination and knowledge transmission in product development:
Document-based vs Human-network-based
The contrasting knowledge structures and organisation of product development have also led the
two firms to adopt different methods of coordination and knowledge transmission throughout the
product cycle.
Within B-firm, product development moves sequentially through the different phases.  Each stage
is governed by rigorous formal planning and scheduling.  The knowledge and information
required for each stage is discrete and resides independently in the individuals within the specific
functions.  Coordination across the functions is achieved via passing on detailed documents and
full specifications from one phase of the project to the next.  The smooth operation of this system
requires systematic codification and structuring of knowledge into a form that can be easily
communicated and transmitted across the individuals and functional groups.  Knowledge residing
in the individuals within specific functions will have to be 'externalised' and translated into
procedures, guidelines or specifications for transmission to other members of the organisation.
 Tacit knowledge, as far as possible, will have to be codified and made explicit so that it can be
easily understood and accessed by those who do not share a common experience or background.
 In other words, relevant knowledge is extracted from the individuals and groups and stored
within the organisation in written procedures and documents.   
In contrast, the overlapping approach in J-firm is highly dependent on intensive human-network-
based communication and knowledge sharing.  Project coordination is achieved via frequent
reciprocal communication and mutual adjustment.  It is less dependent on formal planning and
rigorous review at each stage but requires project team members to engage in intensive
communication and interaction throughout the product development cycle.  Within this approach,
knowledge required for overall project achievement is stored 'organically' in team relationships
and behaviourial routines.  It is coordinated and transmitted through intensive human interaction
and extensive networking throughout the organisation.  The observation made by a B-firm
engineer, that '[in J-firm] there's nobody who is an expert...it's a case of who knows what', sums
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up well the diffuse nature of knowledge in J-firm.  Further, in J-firm, the overlapping work roles
and sharing of common experience helps to reduce the social distance between project members,
enabling them to develop a 'common code' which facilitates the  rapid transfer of tacit knowledge.
 This human-network form of knowledge transmission makes the system less dependent on
detailed documentation and written procedures.
B-firm engineers who are used to operating in a document-based environment felt helpless when
confronted with the situation in J-firm where written procedures do not seem to exist:
In the West there is more of this tendency to turn around jobs so we've invented quality
procedures, quality manuals, process manuals so that somebody coming in at a medium
management or engineer level can very quickly get into the way things are done.  Here's
a manual, here's the procedures, here are the forms.  In J-firm, we join at a medium level
but we don't have any of that early background and there are no manuals to help us...
In B-firm, design knowledge generated by  the upstream staff is transmitted in detailed and
'complete' specifications and blueprints.  However, in J-firm design specifications tend to remain
flexible until the final phase; it is open to mutual adjustment and modification throughout the
project cycle.  As a J-firm engineer put it:
Our designers do not normally insist on their own ideas. The specification is normally
never 100 per cent, I would say it's only about 50 or 60 %    The remaining bit is open to
discussion and adjustment later on among the various members...
Such mutual adjustment and human-network coordination is viable within a system where project
members share common knowledge and mutual tacit understanding based on common corporate
experience.  These attributes are sustained by the practice of long-term stable employment which
ensures that shared knowledge is retained within the firm.  For many of the B-firm engineers,
who do not share such common site-specific knowledge, and are used to working according to
precise written documents, the 'flexible' specifications seem ambiguous and misleading.  The
following remark by a B-firm engineer illustrates the problem:
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It [the specification] would be ambiguous quite a lot of times and that could actually be
quite misleading. So I think a lot of the people in my group would tend to work things out
for themselves rather than asking questions because it didn't always come back very clear.
From the other side, a project manager in J-firm also commented on the difficulties they
encountered in articulating their ideas to their foreign partners:
We need to find a way to improve our communication with our partners in B-firm.
Having worked together, it made me realise that part of the problem is that our engineers
are not really good at producing documents.  Our design and development are all done
with great accuracy but we find it difficult to explain clearly 'what we are trying to do at
this stage' and 'how and why the design is done this way but not the other way'.  Unlike
communicating to other departments, we find it difficult to express ourselves clearly to
our partners overseas.  This has caused them 'indigestion'.
The contrasting modes of coordination and knowledge transmission highlight the effects of the
different degree of tacitness of knowledge applied by the engineers in the two firms.  They also
reinforce the different capacity of the two organisations in codifying and articulating the
knowledge generated.  Knowledge transmitted through human-networks is clearly context bound,
less encodable and not immediately transparent to outsiders.  In contrast, document-based
knowledge is much more discrete, explicit and readily transferrable.
EFFECTS ON COLLABORATION OF CONTRASTING KNOWLEDGE
STRUCTURES AND ORGANISATION OF TECHNICAL WORK
The differences in the organisation of knowledge and work in different societal settings are of
more than just theoretical interest.  They can  impede global collaboration.  The evidence of this
study shows that the incompatibility between the British professional and the Japanese
organisational models of knowledge structure has not only persistently generated tensions and
conflicts in the joint work between the two firms but more seriously, it has resulted in project
failures.  It has also weakened the technological relationship over time and caused the adoption
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of a second best, 'arm's length' approach to collaboration.  There is also evidence that the
differing degrees of 'tacitness' of knowledge between the two firms have brought about
asymmetry in knowledge transfer.
1. Poor project performance and failures
The interviews with project managers and engineers engaged in collaborative work show that the
majority of the joint projects between the two firms have either progressed much slower than
expected, been terminated half way through, or resulted in failure.  Although project performance
tends to be influenced by a complex array of factors, there is substantial evidence from the study
that the differences in the organisation of knowledge and work between the partner firms have
been a major cause of poor project performance.  Many of the managers and engineers
interviewed repeatedly pointed to the problems of poor communication, misinterpretation of
specifications and the clash between their approaches to product development as major causes
of poor performance in their joint work.
One particularly telling example involves a joint project in which B-firm was contracted to
design a product for the Japanese market based on the technology and product specifications
supplied by J-firm.  The project failed because B-firm was unable to deliver the final product
despite having to remake some of the parts four times.  The project manager in charge of the
project in B-firm admitted that the mistakes were due to, to put in his own words:
'misunderstanding of specifications, misunderstanding what we were told in conversations,
misunderstanding what we thought were technical agreements and so on'.
This particular case well illustrates  how differences in the organisation of knowledge and work
between firms can inhibit knowledge transfer and obstruct collaborative work.  To start with,
 the product specification supplied by J-firm was built on the assumption of an overlapping
approach to product development. It was based on an expectation that the original design concept
generated upstream would be subject to changes and modifications  with the aid of downstream
on-site knowledge as the project progressed.  Hence, in many respects, the specification produced
by J-firm was a flexible and 'incomplete' document allowing plenty of scope for adjustment and
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mutual adaptation throughout the product cycle.  It was not a fixed blueprint containing 'finalised'
knowledge.  As a J-firm engineer put it:
...the specification does not cover everything.  It's not meant to be 100 percent.  I  would
say it probably covers only about 50 to 60 percent of the design details.  What normally
happens is that we validate the quality of the design as we go along,  various aspects of
it can be changed under different circumstances
The design team in B-firm who were used to a sequential and logical design approach based on
completed specifications at the outset, however, found the specification from J-firm ambiguous
and misleading. The project manager in B-firm, quoted above, commented on the problems they
faced:
I think the difficulty is that the base specification - when we read them, we found them
ambiguous in many senses.  They are not like B-firm specifications.  So what we did, we
sought clarification from J-firm and we got a lot of clarification, but, we still made
mistakes.
Other project team members complained that J-firm built assumptions into their specifications.
 One reported:
I think they build in assumptions. Because, as I said, we've had difficulty in
understanding specification and we had a review with higher management recently on
this project - I feel they tend not to put themselves in our place and see the difficulties
that we were faced with. 
The difficulties were further compounded by the fact that J-firm engineers, who have traditionally
adopted a 'learning-by-doing' and experimentation approach to product development (referred
to as 'low-level design'), were unable to articulate their ideas in a logical, consistent form, readily
understood by B-firm engineers who were used to operating under what they described as a 'high
level' design language.  A J-firm engineer explained the difficulties encountered:
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Part of the problem is the differences in our design culture. They [B-firm] tend to start
with 'high-level' abstract design: creating a model on the computer to validate the
function and  this behavioral model is described theoretically in a specific language. 
Whereas in our company, in order to speed up the development process, we skip the
abstract design stage and proceed straight to gate level design. We put the whole thing
together first and then do the validation... We do not have the so-called 'high level' design
language for describing the technology which we use.
To sum up, J-firm's interactive way of working is highly dependent on collective knowledge
sharing between upstream and downstream staff.  Product development in J-firm is not led and
'pushed' by a priori design knowledge but is 'pulled' along by emergent on-site operational
knowledge generated through learning-by-doing and intensive interaction among project team
members.  This approach tends to create a great deal of 'tacit' knowledge which is not amenable
to codification.  It can only be effectively transmitted among members with common knowledge
and shared 'coding schemes'.  Insofar as the knowledge structures and coding schemes between
the two firms differ, the transfer of such tacit knowledge has proved to be highly problematic.
2. 'Diluted Technological Partnership': Arm's Length 'Interface Collaboration'
The poor performance of a number of major collaborative projects and the difficulties in
reconciling the two contrasting systems have inhibited the two firms from developing a close
technological partnership despite growing market pressures for greater collaboration.  Evidence
from the interviews at two different points of time (1992 and 1995) suggests that the
technological relationship has weakened rather than strengthened over time. Indeed, there have
been very few genuine joint product development projects engaging mixed teams of engineers
in common activities.   The main method of working together has been that of an arm's length
'interface collaboration'.  This typically involves a clear division of labour across the two partner
firms, that is the partners each work independently on one part of the project and join forces at
the end to link the separate development efforts into a final product. Most of the more recent
collaborative work has been merely adaptive, such as modifying a product or process developed
by one of the partner firms to suit local market requirements.  Overall coordination between the
two partner teams takes place via  a small number of interface managers or engineers at the senior
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level who occasionally meet to exchange information and make critical decisions. 
Although top management in both companies felt that they could potentially have benefitted from
forging a closer relationship by engaging in genuine joint development work, the operational
difficulties encountered have thus far prevented them from doing so.  The following remark by
a senior executive from J-firm illustrates the point :
As far as possible, we would rather not work too closely together.  Our ways of working
are very different, problems are bound to occur if we have joint project teams pursuing
common activities.  Yes, we have joint development projects but the way we do it is to
divide up the work into separate parts each with its own clearly defined objectives. We
discuss how the whole project is to be carved up beforehand, and after that, each team is
free to pursue its own project in its own way... In fact, some time ago there was a
proposal for setting up a joint team but that was quickly rejected by the top management
because they simply did not believe it would work... 
The above sentiment was echoed by a manager in B-firm:
I think there's been one or two attempts to start off joint R & D projects, but it's very
difficult...  I think we could gain a lot by actually doing some genuine joint development
projects, But I think it's going to be quite difficult to get to that stage.  I think there's got
to be a change in the way in which B-firm is managed... And I think it needs a change of
culture almost.
Although interface collaboration is the main method of joint work at present,  it is potentially
unstable and has many limitations.  It confines the flow of information and coordination to a
small number of interface points at the senior level in both firms, but in practice the span of
issues involved in complex technological work tends to defy such few contact points.  As one
B-firm engineer put it: 'Development is very difficult and there are lots and lots of interfaces and
lots and lots of things can go wrong'. This arm's length method of collaboration not only makes
joint work difficult for the operating engineers, it also severely restricts the scope of technical
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collaboration between the two firms.  Many project managers and engineers interviewed pointed
out that this approach only works for certain types of development projects 'where things can be
done in isolation'.  For more complex technological work, carving up the project between two
separate teams can be extremely inefficient and create many technical problems.
It appears that the management in both firms are well aware of the limitations of the current arm's
length method of collaboration.  However, they have been persistently frustrated by the
difficulties in reconciling the two different systems and the lack of a better alternative method
for achieving greater synergy. 
3. Asymmetry in Knowledge Transfer and Organisational Learning 
The study has also identified another potential long-term problem in the collaborative
relationship: asymmetry in knowledge transfer.  This appears to stem from the different degree
of tacitness of the knowledge base between the two firms, the contrasting methods of knowledge
transmission and their differing 'absorptive capacity'.
As already illustrated, the dominant form of knowledge in use in J-firm is characterised by its
high degree of tacitness and is transmitted through an established network of human
relationships.  It is distributed, contextual, less articulable and is not immediately transparent to
outsiders.  The transmisson of this type of knowledge requires a great deal of prior investment
in building up a shared context and common understanding between communication parties
(Boisot 1995; Hall 1976).  For B-firm staff to be able to appreciate and access this kind of tacit
knowledge, they will need not only the language skills but, more importantly, to establish direct
and intimate social relationships with staff in J-firm. In other words, the learners will need to
become 'insiders' of the social community in order to acquire its particular viewpoint (Brown and
Duguid 1991).  Such relationship cannot be established quickly. It requires the gradual building
up of personal contacts and networks which can be costly and time-consuming. In stark contrast,
it has proved to be much easier for J-firm to gain access and extract knowledge from B-firm. 
This is because the knowledge base of B-firm is more explicit and discrete. Unlike shared
knowledge which is diffuse and extremely 'sticky', individual expert knowledge is more visible
and can be more readily transferred through the mobility of a small number of individuals.  For
34
example, a number of project managers and engineers on secondment to J-firm describe how
their 'experience would rub off on them while they were talking to people in J-firm'.  Further, in
contrast to tacit knowledge which cannot be easily articulated, a large part of the knowledge held
in B-firm is codified and readily available in documents.  Almost all the managers and engineers
interviewed in both firms noted the asymmetrical flow of knowledge and information out of B-
firm.  Two B-firm staff made the following remarks when asked about information flow between
the two firms:
...if anything, I think we have supplied more information than J-firm has, but in most
cases there's no reluctance to supply information.  The only barrier is technical language,
translations and that kind of thing...'
...technical information regarding new technology... Management information, or more
marketing information, that's very much nett going to Japan.  Little coming from Japan,
a lot going to Japan.
A senior manager in J-firm also noted the same and pointed out the reasons for it:
In terms of the amount of information, we are definitely getting more out of B-firm than
the other way round.  The reason is that most of the information is documented in
English.  It is all fairly well-documented and can be passed over just like that.  Whereas
in our company, most of the things are not documented.  Even if they were, they are not
in English in the first place.
An additional factor contributing to the asymmetry lies in the differences in the 'absorptive
capacity' of the two firms - a term suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). It is defined as the
ability of the organisation to acquire, assimilate and exploit outside knowledge.  In the earlier part
of this paper, it has already been pointed out that J-firm has a tendency to dispatch larger and
more diverse teams to engage in collaborative projects, owing to its diffuse knowledge structure.
 In contrast, B-firm tend to rely on a small number of senior managers and engineers, where
specialist expertise resides, for coordination and interfacing with J-firm.  These differences have
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resulted in J-firm exposing a broader range of potential 'receptors' and being able to pick up more
varied and richer knowledge and information.  The diverse team structure in J-firm also aids
rapid transmission and diffusion of the acquired knowledge back into the organisation.  It enables
learning to occur in a more coordinated and collective fashion.  In contrast, in B-firm, the reliance
on a small number of key experts as 'gatekeepers' could potentially limit the scope and range of
knowledge acquired.  This is because professional expertise entails 'perceptual filters' which may
keep experts from noticing knowledge and information outside their specific domains (Starbuck,
1992).  Individual learning is often constrained by a limited ability to interpret complex reality
(Dodgson 1993: 384): Simon's (1957) bounded rationality problem .  Further,  the small number
of gate keepers and the emphasis on individual ownership of knowledge within B-firm may also
inhibit the transfer of knowledge across units and functions that are distant from the original
interfacing points.
 
The asymmetrical knowledge transfer and organisational learning can potentially cause instability
in the cooperative relationship.   Insofar as cooperating partners are seeking joint knowledge
creation on the basis of a complementary and equal contribution, asymmetry in knowledge
accumulation can result in one partner becoming over-dependent and vulnerable (Hamel 1991;
Pucik 1988; Inkpen and Beamish 1997).  This tends to generate a sense of insecurity and
suspicion among staff in the dependent partner which  in turn can inhibit the development of an
open and trusting relationship, and thus reduce the capacity of the partner firms in joint
knowledge creation.
 
CONCLUSIONS
Based on an empirical analysis of a close collaboration between a British and a Japanese high-
technology firm, this study has illustrated how differences in the organisation of knowledge
between firms in different societal settings can seriously inhibit collaborative work and impede
effective knowledge sharing across national boundaries.  The research has extended and applied
Polanyi's philosophical concept of 'tacit knowledge' in a much wider societal context. It develops
a conceptual framework for analyzing the main differences between the British 'professional' and
the Japanese 'organisational' models of organisation of knowledge in high-level technical work.
 It shows how the dominant form of knowledge held in organisations, its degree of tacitness and
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the way in which it is structured, organised and utilised can vary considerably between firms in
different societal settings.  These differences are deeply embedded in the contrasting national
systems of skills formation, labour markets and occupational structures.  
The study demonstrates the strong presence of societal effects on the knowledge base of the firm
and how this  might impose a limit on knowledge sharing and organisational learning across
national boundaries.  It questions the argument presented in much of the management literature
that globalisation of business and the acceleration of cross-border learning will lead to a
worldwide diffusion of technologies and knowledge and weaken the 'societal effect' (Ohmae
1990; Adler 1990; Mueller 1994).  There is no evidence in the present study that the two partner
firms, despite their long years of close collaboration, have become more alike in their
organisational forms or knowledge bases.  On the contrary, the two firms appear to have become
more divergent in their distinctive and complementary capabilities.  Indeed, 'organisational
learning' has made the partner firms become more aware of their fundamental  differences.  This
has led the two firms to pursue an arm's length collaborative relationship and a strategy of partner
specialisation in complementary activities within their collaborative ventures.   In this respect,
collaboration has become more a vehicle for gaining 'access' to, rather than 'absorption', of the
partner firms' knowledge assets.  Contrary to the 'globalisation' argument, cross-national
collaboration can potentially lead to a strengthening of the societal specificity of the knowledge
base of the firm, not weakening it.
Although the evidence presented in this paper is based on one case study and this inevitably
limits its scope for generalization, a study of this kind can be particularly revealing.  My previous
research in the British and Japanese electronics industries highlights significant societal
differences in the organisation of technical work between firms in the two countries, many of
which are reflected in the two partner firms examined in this study.  Collaboration between these
two different systems has brought to the forefront the main 'points of friction' as perceived and
experienced by the actors as they interact with each other.  The approach adopted in this study
allows a close analysis of the differences in the structure of knowledge embedded in the two
systems and the problems it has generated for actors operating across the normative boundaries.
 'Societal effect' is not only an academic theory in comparative social research, it creates real
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'problems' for actors operating in the global economy.     
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